Ted Duke v. Randal Graham : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2005
Ted Duke v. Randal Graham : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Martinez, Nick J. Colessides; Attorneys for Appellants.
David R. Williams, Anthony M. Grover; Woodbury and Kesler, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Duke v. Graham, No. 20051036.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2600
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA 
DEL CARMEN SAVALA 
CARDENAS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
RANDAL GRAHAM, an individual; 
and DAVID GRAHAM, an individual, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Supreme Court Case No. 20051036-SC 
Trial Court Civil Case No. 040925274 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL 
Attorneys for Appellees'. 
DAVID R. WILLIAMS 
Woodbury & Kesler, PC 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358 
Attorneys for Appellants: 
JOHN MARTINEZ (USBA #4523) 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Tele: 801.582.1386; Fax: 801.582.7664 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696) 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: 801.521.4441; Fax: 801.521.4452 
FILED 
(Oral Argument and Published Decision Requested) UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA 
DEL CARMEN SAVALA 
CARDENAS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
RANDAL GRAHAM, an individual; 
and DAVID GRAHAM, an individual, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Supreme Court Case No. 20051036-SC 
Trial Court Civil Case No. 040925274 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), Appellants Ted Duke and Maria 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs properly preserved all issues for appeal 
Plaintiffs properly preserved all four issues for appeal as follows: 
Issue I: Did the trial court violate Sections 48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809 of the Utah 
Revised Limited Liability Act by summarily confirming an arbitrator's award expelling both 
Appellants as members-and removing Appellant Duke as manager-of a limited liability 
company, even though such Sections expressly require that a "court" make an independent 
"judicial determination" about whether such sanctions should be imposed? (R. 371 -Opening 
Brief Addendum Exh. 4,11. 14-17, p.184; R. 202, 204-Memo. in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for TRO, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 1, p.3;1 R. 213, 215-17-Memo. in Opp. to 
Defendants' Motion for Confirmation of Award and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Vacate Award, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 2, pp.3-5)2 
1
. That memorandum provides in relevant part: 
II. Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the merits 
Plaintiffs have concurrently herewith filed a Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award 
on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. As set out in the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities accompanying such Motion, the arbitrator took it upon himself to 
expel Plaintiffs from a limited liability company, which is a function exclusively reserved 
for "judicial determination" by statute and constitutional principle. 
2
. That memorandum provides in relevant part: 
IILA. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Expulsion of 
Members of Limited Liability Companies can only be Accomplished "by judicial 
determination,11 Not by Arbitrators 
The "error" that the arbitrator committed here is that UCA § 48-2c-710 (3), by its 
plain, express terms, provides for expulsion "by judicial determination." The Utah Supreme 
Court has recently stated that 
"The requirement that expulsions be made by judicial determination affords 
members,... through the intervention of a neutral and impartial fact finder, the most 
reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our society." 
CCD. L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, % 26, 529 Utah Adv. Rep. 38. 
1 
Issue II: Did the trial court violate the Due Process and Open Courts Clauses of the 
Utah Constitution by summarily confirming an arbitrator's award expelling both Appellants 
as members~and removing Appellant Duke as manager-of a limited liability company, even 
though such Clauses guarantee Appellants a "day in court" for an independent judicial 
determination about whether such sanctions should be imposed? (R. 37l-Opening Brief 
Addendum Exh. 4,11.14-17,p. 184; R. 202,204-Memo. in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for TRO, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 1, p.3 ;3 R. 213,217-18-Memo. in Opp. to Defendants' 
In this case, the arbitrator took it upon himself to make a determination that the 
Legislature expressly reserved for "judicial determination." As the Utah Supreme Court made 
clear, the policy reason for this reservation is to provide members of limited liability 
companies with "the most reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our 
society," in order to adequately protect the substantial rights that membership in a limited 
liability company confers. Accordingly, only a court can determine expulsion. 
B. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Managers may 
only be removed by Judicial Proceedings Not by Arbitrators 
The Company is a limited liability company operating pursuant to the authority of the 
Utah statute. The Company is managed by its two Managers. Ted Duke, and Randall 
Graham 
Section 48-2c-809 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended provides as follows: 
§ 48-2c-809. Removal by judicial proceeding 
(1) The district court of the county in this state where a company's designated office 
is located, or if it has no designated office in this state, its registered office is located, 
may remove a manager in a proceeding commenced either by the company or by its 
members holding at least 25% of the interests in profits of the company if the Court 
finds that: 
It is clear that the only authority that can remove Ted Duke as Manager is the district 
court in this state; not an arbitrator. A look at the balance of § 809 clearly mandates, in terms 
of its enforcement governance, that only a court of competent jurisdiction can remove a 
manager from his position as a manager of the limited liability company 
3
. That memorandum provides in relevant part: 
II. Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the merits 
Plaintiffs have concurrently herewith filed a Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award 
on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. As set out in the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities accompanying such Motion, the arbitrator took it upon himself to 
expel Plaintiffs from a limited liability company, which is a function exclusively reserved 
2 
Motion for Confirmation of Award and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Award, 
Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 2, pp.5-6)4 
Issue III: Did the trial court err by confirming the arbitrator's award herein, even 
though the arbitrator made no findings to support such award and thereby failed to "make a 
record" as required by Section 78-31a-120 of the Utah Arbitration Act? (R. 371-Opening 
Brief Addendum Exh. 2, p.3 ("The comments are not to be construed or taken to be findings 
of fact or conclusions of law.")). 
Plaintiffs' counsel emphasized to the trial court that the arbitrator had made only 
"comments," and not actual findings and the trial court, after acknowledging that fact, 
nevertheless ruled that the arbitrator's "non-findings" were sufficient. (R. 37\-Reply Brief 
Addendum Exh. 3, p.189,11.8-25; p.190,11.1-25; p.191,11.1-9)5 
for "judicial determination" by statute and constitutional principle. 
4
. That memorandum provides in relevant part: 
IV. Due Process and Open Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution also require that 
Expulsion of Members of Limited Liability Companies Can Only be Accomplished "by 
judicial determination," Not by Arbitrators 
Plaintiffs' right to have a court determine whether they will be deprived of the 
substantial rights of membership in a limited liability company is also protected by the Due 
Process and Open Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that both clauses "guarantee that litigants will have [their] 'day in court'", [quoting Utah 
Due Process and Open Courts constitutional Clauses]. 
The deprivation of the right to membership in a limited liability company is a 
precious and protected right of property. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to their "day in 
court" to preserve that interest, [citing Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6, K38,44 P.3d 663]. 
5
. The trial court was clearly perplexed, but ruled that the arbitrator's statements were 
sufficient nonetheless: 
THE COURT: And I've seen a lot of arbitration awards over the years; I've never seen that 
kind of language included in an award 
THE COURT: He says that they are provided to assist the parties and their counsel to 
understand the reasons that form the basis for the award. However he calls them findings of 
3 
Issue IV: Did the trial court err by refusing to award Appellants their attorney fees, 
costs and interest as required by Section 78-3 la-126(3) of the Utah Arbitration Act? (R. 213, 
221-22-Memo. in Opp. to Defendants' Motion for Confirmation of Award and in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Award, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 2, pp.9-10)6 
II. Defendants fail to address the pivotal question whether Sections 48-2c-710(3) and 
48-2c-809 require that a "court" make an independent "judicial determination" 
in order to expel a member or remove a manager from a limited liability 
company 
The arguments in Part I of Defendants1 brief simply assume that a court is only 
required to "review11 an arbitrator's award. Def Brief, pp. 14-23. Defendants thus utterly fail 
to address the pivotal question about the meaning of the provisions in Utah Code Sections 
48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809 that a "court" make an independent "judicial determination" in 
order to expel a member or remove a manager from a limited liability company. 
The starting point is the language the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act 
which provides in relevant part that a member of a company may be expelled: 
(3) on application by the company or another member, by judicial determination that 
the member: 
(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially affected the 
company's business; 
fact or conclusions. I don't think he has to. I think he's saying, "These are the reasons why 
I've given my award." And I think they are of an assist in trying to understand the whole 
context of the award. 
(R. 311-Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.189,11.23-25; p.191,11.3-9) 
6
. That memorandum provides in relevant part: 
VIII. Plaintiffs Should be Awarded Their Costs, Attorney Fees and Expenses of 
Litigation 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-126 provides for the award of costs, attorney fees and 
expenses of litigation in vacating an arbitrator's award. Since the arbitrator's award should 
be vacated in its entirety, Plaintiffs hereby request such costs, attorney fees and expenses. 
4 
or 
(c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business which makes it 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with the member. 
UTAH CODE § 48-2c-710(3) (Emphasis added). And with respect to removal of managers of 
limited liability companies, the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act further 
provides: 
(1) The district court... may remove a manager ... in a proceeding ... if the court 
finds that: 
(a) the manager engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross abuse of 
authority or discretion with respect to the company; and 
(b) removal is in the best interests of the company. 
(2) The court that removes a manager may bar the manager from reelection for a 
period prescribed by the court. 
(5) If the court orders removal of a manager or member under this section, the clerk 
of the court shall deliver a certified copy of the order to the division for filing. 
UTAH CODE § 48-2c-809 (Emphasis added). 
The plain language of these sections unambiguously assigns to a "court" the exclusive 
responsibility to make a "judicial determination" in order to expel a member or remove a 
manager from a limited liability company. These sections thus envision an original 
proceeding, not an appellate "review" of an arbitrator's award as suggested by Defendants. 
Original "judicial determinations," in contrast to appellate "review" proceedings, are 
those in which the power of a court "in dealing with the pleadings and evidence, in the 
application of the law and in the rendition of judgment according to the right of the case...is 
no different from what it would be if the case were begun there originally...." State v. 
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1941)(citations omitted). 
5 
When the Legislature intends to provide for appellate "review" in Utah courts of 
proceedings previously held before other bodies or officials, it has done so in clear and 
unambiguous terms. See e.g., Utah Code §10-9a-801(2)(a)("Any person adversely affected 
by a final [land use] decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this 
chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court...."); Utah Code 
§ 19-6-205(5)(a)("Any person adversely affected by the board's [hazardous waste facility 
siting] decision may seek judicial review of the decision by filing a petition for review with 
the district court... ."). In contrast, in Sections 48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809 the Legislature 
has explicitly provided for original proceedings, not appellate review. 
Defendants seekto elevate the general provisions ofthe Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
dealing with arbitration remedies, with confirming arbitration awards and with vacating 
arbitration awards, (Utah Code Sections 78-31a-122, 123, 124, respectively), over the 
specific provisions ofthe Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act requiring "judicial 
determinations" by a "court" in order to expel a member or remove a manager from an LLC. 
UTAH CODE §§ 48-2c-710(3), 48-2c-809. This would violate the fundamental principle that 
specific statutes control over general statutes. See e.g., Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, 
f 10,114 P.3d 546 (code section which specifically applied to campaign disclosure statements 
held to govern over Election Code provision applicable to elections generally). 
As a matter of policy, the Legislature obviously was concerned about the manner in 
which members of LLC's could be expelled, and managers could be removed, because ofthe 
extremely important rights that such membership and management positions in a limited 
6 
liability compai i> entail See I I I '"\ I I C O D E §§48 2c / 01 ('" i i lember's interest in a company is 
persoiiiil propt in"" i IK V-X(Pn M W illi 'IOIIK1 cxcqifioiii» "an <n m i il ii iiiiii.iiia^n In in 11 ilic 
compari) ... ."). It is thus apparent why the Legislature therefore expressly provided for 
original judicial determinations, not for initial arbitrator decisions subject to petitions for 
r ^ egislature had intended to give arbitrators shared authority for 
exercisip. : ik /' hi i i '• ; " .s'i if t sc > Instead, coi n its ' \ • ere gi < ' en tl lat ai ithoi itj -
exclusively by way of original proceedings . 
III. Defendants also fail to address the pivotal question whether the Due Process and 
Open Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution require that a " c o u r t " make an 
independent "judicial determination" in order to expel a member or remove a 
m a n a g e r from., a limited liability company 
A "day in court" is a property right protected by the Due Process Clause . >f •l . •: 
Const i tut ion as wel l as a liberty r ight protected by the O p e n Courts Clause of the Utah 
G mstil utii MI. I J i y i C O N S I art I, § ) (Due Process) ; U TA 11 C O N S T , art. I, § 1 1 (Open Courts) . 
11J Miller v. USAA L'as. Ins. Co., , \ n I ' I N 11 I I I " i I \ i i 111 m 111 mi I m 1 1 1 mi 1 1 s 1 1 „ 1 1 1 " » I n 1 1 1 1 1 . i \ i 
c o m m o n law claims adjudicated b> a court instead of by an appraiser implicated 
proper ty and liberty concerns under those consti tutional provis ions . 
S i i i t ib ih „ I'laiiilil I:,,1" lights to have their membersh ip and management posi t ions in 
their L L C adjudicated \\\ \ ill in h i<| I lb IIII uliilraloi nnpluMli."* Ih illi l"l iiiiliill " 
proper ty and liberty concerns under Utah 's D u e Process and Open Courts Clauses . The nature 
o f the r ights to such posi t ions is de termined by the Utah Revised Limi ted Liabili ty Company 
i I \ln< Illi LiiMlnl 'iiiii"Illi slalu.s. Plaintiffs cannot be depr ived of such rights unless the 
provisions for such deprivation u ih I'tu! Ri>viscii I mulnl i ^ihihi\ \ \m\pmw i. / AU 
7 
followed. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970)(welfare benefits cannot be 
withdrawn without due process); Charles Reich, THE NEW PROPERTY, 73 YALE L J. 733, 
783-87 (1964)(government benefits are "new property" protected by procedural due process). 
And that statute expressly provides for a "judicial determination" by a "court." 
IV. The trial court did not conduct a "judicial determination" 
Defendants contend that "the four hearings held before the trial court regarding the 
Award" constituted a "judicial determination" regarding the merits of the arbitrator's award. 
Def. Brief, p.28. Close examination reveals, however, that in none of those four hearings did 
the trial court consider the merits of whether Plaintiffs should be expelled as members and 
Plaintiff Duke removed as a manager of the LLC, as required by UTAH CODE § 48-2c-
710(3)("judicial determination" required to expel a member); UTAH CODE § 48-2c-809 (only 
a "court" may remove a manager).7 The merits were not considered. 
At the August 17, 2005 hearing, lasting 35 minutes, the trial court only considered 
whether to issue a TRO at the request of Defendants to maintain the status quo. (R. 371-
Transcript of trial court hearing, Wednesday, August 17,2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 
3, pp. 16-17, 30, 37) No evidence was presented. 
At the August 24, 2005 hearing, lasting 72 minutes, the trial court only considered 
whether to issue a preliminary injunction, also at the request of Defendants, to maintain the 
status quo. (R. 371-Transcript of trial court hearing, Wednesday, August 24, 2005, Reply 
Brief Addendum Exh. 3, pp .3 8,41,44,92-93,96) The trial court emphasized that it was not 
7
. And, surprisingly, Defendants also concede that "the trial court did not address the 
substantive issues regarding the parties' dispute." Def. Brief, p. 16. 
8 
rt illi: lg 01 1 the in lerits of the arbiti atoi 's a \ \ at ;:I: 
Well, the temporary restraining order, of course, is granted on the basis of probability 
of prevailing - final determination prevailing. So with respect to your - with respect 
to your assumption that the Court has already ruled on that, I've only ruled on the 
probability of prevailing not on the ultimate fact. 
(Id. ™ J ae hearing centered <>., -i^ilier Plaintiffs had violated the previously-
ii» " [E COl i i ; l: i"' • * ai it t : 1 leai e > - idence • : i I con iplian :e \ vitl i 
the order.")). But after five witnesses had testified, Defendants admitted they had not served 
the TRO on Plaintiffs, so the trial court concluded there was n<) violation of the TRO, and 
continued the matter. (Id. , ,i._-r-.. \ j . / ..
 s ) 
A" ilir Sc | 
argument about whether "to convert the TRO to a preliminary iniunction." (R. J /1 -11 
of trial court hearing, Tuesday, September 13, 2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.97, 
pA'K ,111 ('"• I lK 11 I "- 'i' I I lit iiiiil court emphasized that it was not considering the merits of 
THE COURT: Okay. And go ahead and tell nic, then, v\nai 
converting the TRO to preliminary or permanent injunction. 
THE COURT: I'm not talking about the award. I'm talking about the Court's order 
that's in place, that been in place for. I don't know, a month and a half, I guess. 
(Id (i I l l i II <l ft III I " I I I Ilic itrill ir iiil ' jp inluMlh i (iiniiinil HIIIM, I loi IMainMh. IkM 
the merits of the award were not under consideration: 
MR. COLESSIDES: Is the Court going u i -.ke the issue ,;. the award, the 
confirmation of the award, Your Honor? 
IHE COURT: I don't think that today is the day to do that. I think we need to hear, 
perhaps, more evidence on that issue. I don't want to even go into that until we have 
the status re-established. So we can set another time to do that. 
(Id. p.151,11.16-23) 
The October 14,2005 hearing, lasting 61 minutes, was the only one at which the trial 
court had before it the Defendants' request for confirmation of the award and the Plaintiffs1 
request that the award instead should be vacated. (R. 371-Transcript of trial court hearing, 
Friday, October 14, 2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.156,11.12-16; p.195) Instead of 
making an independent judicial determination, however, the trial court simply rubber-
stamped the arbitrator's award. The court signed a two-page "Order Confirming Arbitration 
Award" that provided simply that "The Award issued by arbitrator Kent B. Scott on August 
11, 2005 (the 'Award1) is confirmed. (R. 263-64; Opening Brief Addendum Exh. 2, f 1, pp. 
1-2) The court also signed off on the "Judgement [sic] Conforming to Arbitration Award" 
submitted by Appellees, which provided merely that 
"The Court granted Randal and David Graham's Motion for Order Confirming 
Arbitration Award and for Judgment Conforming to the Award. For the reasons set 
forth in the in the [sic] Award of Arbitrator Kent B. Scott dated August 11,2005 (the 
'Award'), the court enters judgment...." 
(R. 274; Opening Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.l) The "Judgement" simply "...copied 
everything verbatim, including nothing more, and leaving out nothing, than is set forth in the 
award, other than the beginning statements and the concluding signatures." (R. 371-
Transcript of trial court hearing, Friday, October 14, 2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3, 
p.193, 11.8-11) The trial court emphasized that its "Judgement" "...[did not do] anything 
different from signing the confirmation order...." (Id. p. 194,1.4) 
10 
Indeed, the trial court referred to the arbitrator's award as "...a judicial determination." 
(Id. p. 187, 11.14-15) The trial court concluded by emphasizing that it was making no 
independent determination, but simply rubber-stamping the arbitrator's award: 
"I think I've arbitrated personally over the years, as an advocate, maybe 150 
arbitration cases. I have served as an arbitrator also on a number of cases. And I feel 
that it is a ~ it is a good system, but one of the reasons it's good is because the award 
of the arbitrator has such a potential finality. And in this instance, it's obvious that the 
plaintiffs don't agree with what the arbitrator did and, you know, that's their 
prerogative. But that doesn't mean that it shouldn't be enforced under the law." 
(14 p.195,11.2-11) 
In summary, the merits concerned whether Plaintiffs should be expelled as members 
and Plaintiff Duke removed as a manager of the LLC, pursuant to UTAH CODE § 48-2c-
710(3)("judicial determination" required to expel a member) and UTAH CODE § 48-2c-809 
(only a "court" may remove a manager). At the first three hearings, the trial court expressly 
and emphatically avoided dealing with that question. At the fourth hearing, although it 
acknowledged the issue was before it, the trial court simply rubber-stamped the arbitrator's 
determination. 
V. The proceedings by the arbitrator were not a "judicial determination11 by a 
"court" 
Defendants contend that the arbitration proceedings were a "judicial determination" 
by a "court". Def. Brief, pp. 12,24. Arbitration, however, is a "quasi-judicial" proceeding, not 
a "judicial" one. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6,132,44 P.3d 663. And it defies 
both logic and language to contend an arbitrator is a "court". 
11 
If the Legislature had intended to give arbitrators the power to expel members or 
remove managers of LLCs, it could have provided for "quasi-judicial" determinations by 
"arbitrators." Instead, it provided for "judicial determinations" by "courts". Defendants' 
argument to the contrary seeks nothing less than to re-write legislation. 
VI. The parties' arbitration agreement did not waive the right to a "judicial 
determination" 
Making only a general reference "to the Operating Agreement's arbitration provision," 
Defendants contend Plaintiffs waived their right to a judicial determination as required by 
statute and constitutional provisions. Def. Brief, p.29. 
As set out in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, the Operating Agreement did not waive the 
right to an independent judicial determination because such a waiver must be "expressed in 
the most unequivocal terms." Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070, 1074 
(Utah 1981); Opening Brief, pp. 16-17. As this court has emphasized, "The dictionary 
definition of the word, 'unequivocal,' is as follows: 'Not doubtful; not ambiguous; clear; 
sincere."' Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co.. 118 Utah 41,45,233 P.2d 
699, 701 (1951). And Defendants point to no such provision in the Operating Agreement 
waiving the right to an independent judicial determination provided to Plaintiffs by Utah 
Code Sections 48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809. 
Moreover, even if such an unequivocal waiver appeared in the Operating Agreement, 
as also set out in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, such a provision would be unenforceable because 
it would violate the express terms of state statutes meant to guarantee a judicial 
determination, which this court has described as "the most reliable safeguard against 
12 
inequitable treatment available in our society." CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, J^ 26,116 
P.3d 366; Opening Brief, pp. 17-18. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should be ordered to vacate the arbitrator's award and to issue such 
orders as will compensate Appellants for harms resulting from the arbitrator's unlawful 
award, including payment by Defendants of Plaintiffs' attorney fees, costs and interest in the 
proceedings below as well as on this appeal. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 2006. 
MARTINEZ 
Attorney for Appellants 
13 
REPLY ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for TRO 
(R. 202-206) 
Exhibit 2: Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Confirmation of Award and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate 
Award (R. 213-223) 
Exhibit 3: Excerpts from Transcript of trial court hearings. (R. 371) 
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PLAINTIFFS' REPLY 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1 
(Plaintiffs' Memo, in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for TRO) 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: 801.521-4441 
Fax: 801.521-4452 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA 
DEL CARMEN ZAVALA CARDENAS, 
an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual; and 
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Civil Case No. 04092 W 2 n 4 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
(Arbitrator: Kent B. Scott) 
Pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Ted Duke and 
Maria Del Carmen Zavala Cardenas ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their undersigned counsel of 
record, hereby submit the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the 
Defendants' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By order dated February 23,2005, this court ordered arbitration of the parties1 dispute. 
On Thursday, August 11, 2005, Arbitrator Kent B. Scott issued an award expelling Plaintiffs 
from Way Cool Dirt Cheap LLC ("WCDC"), a limited liability company of which both were 
members and Plaintiff Duke also was manager. 
Defendants have moved for a Temporary Restraining Order. For each of the following 
grounds, Defendants* motion should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants have unclean hands because they failed to move to confirm the arbitrator's 
award, and instead engaged in self-help which provoked a confrontation 
A party in whose favor an arbitrator's award has been rendered may move to confirm the 
award.1 The award by itself is not self-executing.2 Defendants have belatedly recognized this 
reality by moving to confirm the award here. 
Before moving to confirm the award, however, defendants by their own admission 
engaged in self-help and, predictably, precipitated a confrontation that the requirement for 
confirmation of an award is intended to avoid. Defendants therefore have unclean hands and 
\ Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-123; Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. 2002 
UT6,1J34,44P.3d663. 
2
. See Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Company, 108 Idaho 181, 183, 
697 P.2d 1195,1197 (an arbitrator's award is not self-enforcing, that is why the statute 
distinguishes between a "judgment" and an "award"). 
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should not be rewarded with the equitable relief of a temporary restraining order. 
II. Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the merits 
Plaintiffs have concurrently herewith filed a Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award on 
the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. As set out in the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities accompanying such Motion, the arbitrator took it upon himself to expel Plaintiffs 
from a limited liability company, which is a function exclusively reserved for "judicial 
determination" by statute and constitutional principle. 
Accordingly, defendants cannot demonstrate a "substantial likelihood" of prevailing on 
the merits, and their request for a temporary restraining order therefore should be denied. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65A(e). 
HI. Defendants have not supported their Motion with admissible evidence 
A movant for a temporary restraining order must demonstrate the factual foundation for 
its request by admissible evidence.3 Defendants1 motion herein is not supported by any affidavit 
or other admissible evidence. The only affidavit is that made by David R. Williams; it is not 
admissible and therefore, should not be allowed to be considered by the Court; it contains 
double and triple hearsay evidence. By separate motion plaintiffs have objected to the Williams' 
affidavit. Accordingly, defendants1 motion should be denied. 
3
. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)("A restraining order...may issue only upon a showing by the 
applicant..."). 
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IV. Defendants fail to set out the nature of the relief they seek 
Nowhere in their moving papers do defendants set out what it is that they want this court 
to enjoin. Without a specific description of what it is they seek to enjoin, Plaintiffs could not 
possibly be expected to obey, and this Court could not be expected to be able to enforce.4 
DATED t h i s / / c l a y of August, 2005. 
NICKJ.COi 
Attorney forPlaintiffs 
4
. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(d)(f,Every restraining order...shall be specific in terms and shall 
describe in reasonable detail...the act or acts sought to be restrained."). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned filed the original of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court: 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
and served a copy of the foregoing upon the following: 
David R. Williams 
Woodbury & Kesler, PC 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358 
ff day o: this %1_ day of August, 2005 addressed as set forth above. 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2 
(Plaintiffs' Memo, in Opp. to Defendants' Motion for Confirmation of Award 
and in Snnnort of Plaintiff^1 IVTntinn tt\ Va/»o*o Awowi\ 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: 801.521-4441 
Fax: 801.521-4452 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA 
DEL CARMEN ZAVALA CARDENAS, 
an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDALL GRAHAM 
DAVID GRAHAM, an 
Defendants. 
an individual; and 
individual, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSIT1 ON 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ORDER CONFIRMING 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
AND 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO VACATE 
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
Civil Case No. 04092574 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
(Arbitrator: Kent B. Scott) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-124 and § 78-31a-126, Plaintiffs Ted Duke and 
Maria Del Carmen Zavala Cardenas ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their undersigned counsel of 
record, hereby submit the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of their 
Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award issued by Arbitrator Kent B. Scott on Thursday, August 
11,2005, on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, and request costs, attorney 
fees and expenses of litigation in overturning such arbitrator's award. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By order dated February 23,2005, this court ordered arbitration of the parties1 dispute. 
On Thursday, August 11,2005, Arbitrator Kent B. Scott ("arbitrator") issued an award expelling 
Plaintiffs from Way Cool Dirt Cheap LLC ("WCDC" or the "Company"), a limited liability 
company of which both were members and Plaintiff Duke also was one of the Managers. A copy 
of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC, (the 
"Agreement" or the Operating Agreement") is appended herein marked exhibit "A" and by this 
reference is incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
The arbitrator based his order of expulsion on his determination that grounds for such 
expulsion existed under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (c). As set forth below, the 
arbitrator thereby exceeded his authority, therefore the arbitrator's award in its entirety should be 
vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Applicable Law 
The parties through their agreement have provided that ,fThe arbitration procedure shall 
be governed by the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16... .nl As this court 
determined in its prior order, the substantive provisions of the federal act, as well as the 
procedural provisions, are mirrored by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
*. See Exhibit "A." Amended Operating Agreement, f 8.3(a). 
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II. The Arbitrator's Award May be Vacated for "Exceeding Authority" 
Although the terms of the statutes differ somewhat, under both the federal and state 
statutes, the arbitrator's award may be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator "exceeded" his 
authority. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)("where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made; Utah Code §§ 78-31a-124(l)(d)("an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority"). 
An arbitrator "exceeds authority" by acting in "manifest disregard of the law."2 An 
arbitrator acts in "manifest disregard of the law" when "the error is obvious and capable of being 
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified as an arbitrator" and "implies that 
the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to 
ignore or pay no attention to it."3 
IIL A. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Expulsion of 
Members of Limited Liability Companies can only be Accomplished "by judicial 
determination," Not by Arbitrators 
The "error" that the arbitrator committed here is that UCA § 48-2c-710 (3), by its plain, 
express terms, provides for expulsion "by judicial determination." The Utah Supreme Court has 
recently stated that 
"The requirement that expulsions be made by judicial determination affords members,... 
2
. Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton. 2001 UT 36, If 7, 23 P.3d 1035 (action in 
"manifest disregard of law" constitutes "exceeding authority"). 
3
. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996). 
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through the intervention of a neutral and impartial fact finder, the most reliable safeguard 
against inequitable treatment available in our society.1'4 
In this case, the arbitrator took it upon himself to make a determination that the 
Legislature expressly reserved for "judicial determination." As the Utah Supreme Court made 
clear, the policy reason for this reservation is to provide members of limited liability companies 
with "the most reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our society," in order 
to adequately protect the substantial rights that membership in a limited liability company 
confers. Accordingly, only a court can determine expulsion. 
B. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Managers may only be 
removed by Judicial Proceedings Not by Arbitrators 
The Company is a limited liability company operating pursuant to the authority of the 
Utah statute. The Company is managed by its two Managers. Ted Duke, and Randall Graham. 
Under UCA §48-2c-804(6)(d) "a manager need not be a member of the company or a resident of 
this state;" It is obvious that the reason that the arbitrator did not include in the AWARD the 
removal of Ted Duke as a manager, because he assumed that this was a "Management by 
Members" limited liability company, as provided for by UCA §48-2c-803. That in itself is an 
error. 
Section 48-2c-809 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended provides as follows: 
§ 48-2c-809. Removal by judicial proceeding 
(1) The district court of the county in this state where a company's designated office is 
4
. CCD. L.C. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, ^  26, 529 Utah Adv. Rep. 38. 
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located, or if it has no designated office in this state, its registered office is located, may 
remove a manager in a proceeding commenced either by the company or by its members 
holding at least 25% of the interests in profits of the company if the Court finds that: 
It is clear that the only authority that can remove Ted Duke as a Manager is the district 
court in this state; not an arbitrator. A look at the balance of § 809 clearly mandates, in terms of 
its enforcement governance, that only a court of competent jurisdiction can remove a manager 
from his position as a manager of the limited liability company. 
For the many reasons stated in the CCD, LLC v Millshap case the arbitrator's award 
should also be vacated in its entirety, and particularly, since the actual "AWARD" does not order 
the removal of Ted Duke as one of the Managers.5 The arbitrator's written comments cannot act 
as authority for Ted Duke's removal as a Manager of the Company. 
Respectfully, the arbitrator's award should also be reversed on those grounds. 
IV, Due Process and Open Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution also require that 
Expulsion of Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies Can Only be 
Accomplished "by judicial determination/1 Not by Arbitrators 
Plaintiffs1 right to have a court determine whether they will be deprived of the substantial 
rights of membership and management in a limited liability company is also protected by the 
5The instrument entitled as the "AWARD" in its AWARD section does not order the 
removal of Duke as the Manager. However, in the part entitled "ARBITRATOR'S WRITTEN 
COMMENTS" on page 6, paragraph 7, the arbitrator writes that"... R. Gragam [sic] as the 
remaining manager." It is noteworthy that the Arbitrator does not consider the foregoing to be a 
part of the AWARD. He states in the introductory paragraph "The comments are not to be 
construed or taken to be findings of fact or conclusions of law." Emphasis added. 
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Due Process and Open Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution.6 The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that both clauses "guarantee that litigants will have [their] fday in court'".7 
The deprivation of the right to membership and management in a limited liability 
company is a precious and protected right of property. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to their 
"day in court" to preserve that interest. 
V. The Arbitrator Herein Acted in "Manifest Disregard" of the Law 
The statutory requirement that expulsion must be accomplished through "judicial 
determination" is "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average 
person qualified as an arbitrator."8 The constitutional foundation of that right is equally obvious. 
In this case, the arbitrator expressly cited Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (c) as 
the bases for his decision to expel Plaintiffs. He thereby made it eminently explicit that he 
"appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decidefd] to ignore or pay 
6
. Utah's Due Process Clause, Article I, section 7 provides: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Utah's Open Courts Clause, Article I, section 11 provides: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party." 
7
. Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. 2002 UT 6, ^ 38,44 P.3d 663. 
8
. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996). 
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no attention to it."9 
Therefore, the Arbitrators award should be vacated. 
VI. The Award Should be Vacated in its Entirety 
In the remainder of his decision, the arbitrator purported to adjudicate grounds for 
expulsion as set out in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710(3) which are reserved exclusively for 
"judicial determination." Accordingly, the award should be vacated in its entirety. 
VTI. Additional Grounds for the Vacation10 of the Arbitrator's Award. 
A. The arbitrator erred in ruling against Zavala because of the provisions of UCA §48-
2c-807(3). Zavala as a member owning ten percent (10%) in and of the Company's membership 
interest and in the Company's profits and loses, enjoys limited immunity from liability as against 
the Company and to the other members by virtue of the statute which states the following: 
§ 48-2c-807(3) Duties of managers and members 
(3) A member of a manager-managed company who is not also a manager owes no 
fiduciary duties to the company or to other members solely by reason of acting in 
the capacity of a member. (Emphasis added). 
9
. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996). 
10The evidence in the record before the arbitrator does not support the arbitrator's factual 
or legal conclusions. See: Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) ("an arbitrator exceeds his or her delegated power if the 
arbitration award has no foundation in reason or fact and is, therefore completely irrational" or " 
utterly lacking in evidentiary support"; see also Pacific Development L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 
\1 n.3,23 P.3d 1035 ("completely irrational" ground is separate type of exceeding authority). 
Each one of the below listed additional grounds are not supported by the record before the 
arbitrator and the 
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There has not been produced any evidence before the arbitrator and none is cited in the 
AWARD which purports to show that Zavala has acted in any capacity other than as a member. 
At no time did Zavala become a manager of the Company. At no time did Zavala acted in any 
way other than in her capacity as a member. The Arbitrator's determination to apply the same 
legal standard to Zavala as to Duke is a manifest error. 
B. The arbitrator erred in his AWARD in deciding that Duke and Zavala converted the 
Company's personal property. The Company was not a party to this proceedings. A conversion 
is an act of wilful interference with a "chattel, done without lawful justification" by which the 
owner entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession11. 
Because the Company - the owner of the alleged conversion - was not a party to the 
arbitration, the arbitrator's AWARD should be vacated on that ground as well. 
C. The arbitrator's interpretation of the non-competition clause to limit its scope to Utah 
is in error. Section 3.8 of the Operating Agreement of the Company is unenforceable because its 
geographic scope of prohibition is unreasonable.12 The arbitrator's decision to limit the non 
competition agreement to Utah only is clearly erroneous, because its scope is unreasonable in its 
geographic application. Assuming arguendo that section 3.8 of the Operating Agreement can be 
nJones v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2003 UT App 355, \% 78 P3d 988 (Ut App 2003). 
Conversion has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as "a wrongful exercise of control over 
personal property in violation of the rights of its owner." See also Frisco Joes Inc. v. Peav. 558 
P.2d 1327,1330(1977). 
12Allen v Rose Park Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608,237 P.2d 823 (1951) 
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modified by the arbitrator, it should be modified to apply to only the counties in which the 
Company operates its stores, i.e., Salt Lake County, Washington County, and Davis County. 
D. Duke and Zavala acted in good faith and on advice of counsel and therefore did not 
convert any of the Company's personal property. Throughout the arbitration the only evidence 
before the arbitrator was the fact that Duke after consulting with his St. George counsel, he 
formed in April 2004, a new limited company, and opened new accounts for running the 
business in St. George. For Graham to prevail on his theory of conversion the scienter of willful 
conduct, is necessary. Duke acted in accordance with the following: Duke did make: (1) a 
request for advice of counsel on the legality of a proposed action; (2) full disclosure of the 
relevant facts to counsel; (3) receipt of advice from counsel that the action to be taken will be 
legal, and (4) reliance in good faith on counsel's advice.13 As a matter of fact the evidence before 
the arbitrator was only that Duke's advice was to do exactly what Duke did. As a matter of fact, 
counsel for Duke, prepared the limited liability company, and he [Duke's counsel] filed it with 
the Utah Division of Corporations. Additionally, Duke's counsel was the person who 
communicated with Wells Fargo bank and established new accounts. 
VIII. Plaintiffs Should be Awarded Their Costs, Attorney Fees and Expenses of Litigation 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-126 provides for the award of costs, attorney fees and expenses 
of litigation in vacating an arbitrator's award. Since the arbitrators award should be vacated in its 
13
. C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 859 F.2d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 
1988)(federal securities law). 
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entirety, Plaintiffs hereby request such costs, attorney fees and expenses. 
DATED this day of August, 2005. 
NICKJ.CQWESSIDES 
Attorney ffrPlaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned filed the original of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court: 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
and served a copy of the foregoing upon the following: 
David R. Williams 
Woodbury & Kesler, PC 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358 
via fax; 
and hand delivery 
this /^cfay of August, 2005 addressed as set forth above. 
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TED DUKE, ET AL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS 
RANDAL GRAHAM, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
DECEMBER 30,2005 
INDEX 
DISTRICT COURT NO. 040925274 
SUPREME COURT NO. 20051036-SC 
DATE p A G E 
FILED DOCUMENT NUMBERS 
12-07-05 COPY OF COVER PAGE OF TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS 364 
ON 02-22-05, 08-17-05, 08-24-05, 09-13-05,10-14-05 
12-07-05 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT
 3 6 5 
12-13-05 ORDER DIRECTING OFFICER TO DELIVER PROPERTY 366-367 
12-22-05 APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF EXECUTION 368-370 
12-07-05 TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS ON 02-22-05,08-17-05, 371 
08-24-05, 09-13-05,10-14-05 
EXHIBITS 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA 
DEL CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS, 
an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual; 
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual; and 
CRAIG R. MARIGER, in his capacity as 
purported arbitrator herein, 
Defendants. 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS 
February 22, 2005 
August 17, 2005 
August 24, 2005 
September 13,2005 
October 14, 2005 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
1 2095 DEC 
£ . SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ByQh 
Deputy Clerk 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
District Court Judge 
|eri Kearbey 
Certified Court Transcriber 
12,-50 Gaylene Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
-<? 1/,/i 
TO: The Utah Supreme Court 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attention: Pat Bartholomew 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA 
DEL CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS, 
an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual; 
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual; and 
CRAIG R. MARIGER, in his capacity as 
purported arbitrator herein, 
Defendants. 
OHo^^^7^ 
Case No. 20051036-SC 
Notice is hereby given that on the 6th day of December 2005, a transcript of proceedings held 
before The Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Court Judge, on February 22; August 17; August 24; 
September 13 and October 14, 2005 in the above case were completed and delivered to the managing reporter 
at the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DATED this 6th day of December 2005. 
L J£ri Kearttey 
Certified Court Transcriber 
566-4540 
cc: Nick J. Colessides, Attorney 
David R Williams, W&K 
Clerk of the Court 
FILED DISTRICT SOUR! 
Third Judicial District 
DEC - 1 2005 
COUNTV 
By. ^
s
"
L A K E 
Deputy Clerk 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2005, 3:09 P.M. 
-oooOooo-
THE COURT: Okay. We're here on the matter of 
Duke versus Graham. And, counsel, do you want to state your 
appearances for the record? 
MR. COLESSIDES: Nick J. Colessides appearing on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor. 
MR. WILLIAMS: And David Williams appearing on 
behalf of defendants Randall Graham and David Graham. 
THE COURT: Okay. This matter came to the 
attention of the Court on the filing of a motion for 
temporary restraining order by the defendants seeking to 
enforce the arbitration award of Kent Scott, which was 
handed down recently. And I have the motion for temporary 
restraining order, proposed order. I also have received, 
about 2 0 minutes ago, the response of Mr. Colessides to 
the — to the defendants' papers. 
As I understand it, the parties have been 
operating a business located in St. George and also up here 
in this area. What does the business do? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the business sells, I 
guess, furniture and furniture accessories imported from 
Mexico, pottery, ironworks, those kinds of things. It's a 
retail store that essentially sells furniture and furniture 
accessories. 
16 
1 THE COURT: Okay. And, apparently there was some 
2 disagreement that occurred between the parties involving the 
3 business and whether they should be allowed to open another 
4 business. Anyway, as a result of the disagreements, the 
5 parties went to an arbitration proceeding; is that correct? 
6 As I see it, the arbitration proceeding went about 
7 seven days, and — and the decision of the arbitrator was 
8 handed down. And then the defendants have made some 
9 allegations to the effect that the plaintiffs are in at 
10 least alleged disregard of the arbitration award, 
11 dissipating assets and continuing conduct that the 
12 defendants feel is in violation of the award. Is that 
13 correct? 
14 MR. WILLIAMS: That is correct, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: And Mr. Colessides! memo basically 
16 says, "Award? What award? We don't think there's any legal 
17 award." And then — and if — "whatever there is shouldn't be 
18 enforced anyway because it's not in conformity with the law, 
19 it's exceeding the authority of the arbitrator." Is that 
20 basically it? 
21 MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, yes. Except I would 
22 like to tell the Court Mr. Williams made a motion to also 
23 confirm the award. And to that motion, Your Honor, we have, 
24 obviously, no objection because that's what we wanted to 
25 have. We wanted to have the award come to the Court and be 
17 
made by affidavit? 
MR. COLESSIDES: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Well, the Court is — are you going to want to say 
anything further at this point? 
MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
I'm going to grant the temporary restraining 
order, and we'll set the matter for a preliminary injunction 
hearing. I'm going to further order that the status quo as 
of the issuance of the arbitration award be implemented. 
That is to say, all money, all checks that were in the bank 
accounts or in the cash registers of the store are to be 
returned forthwith. All inventory is to be returned 
forthwith. 
MR. COLESSIDES: From where, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: I don't know. If there's inventory 
that's been removed from storage units or from this other 
facility that's been described, it is to be returned 
forthwith, each piece. 
The vehicle that has been used, after returning 
the equipment, the vehicle — or the inventory, rather, after 
returning the inventory, the vehicle is to be returned to 
the store forthwith. 
Possession of the business shall be delivered to 
30 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Any further questions? 
MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
MR. COLESSIDES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then we'll be in recess. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 3:44 p.m., 
the hearing was concluded.) 
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THE COURT: Okay. We're here on the matter of 
Duke v. Graham. Counsel, do you want to state your 
appearances? 
MR. COLESSIDES: Nick J. Colessides appearing on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor. 
MR. WILLIAMS: David Williams appearing on behalf 
of Randall Graham and David Graham, the defendants. Randall 
Graham is here in the courtroom with me, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. This is the time set for 
preliminary hearing in this matter. This is — I think this 
is your burden at this point, Mr. Williams. So what I'm 
going to do is allow you to go first. We can do it by 
proffer, try to save some time, whatever you'd like, cross-
examine after the proffer, or whatever you'd like to do. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, may I be heard for 
one moment? I'd be willing to — the time today is for the 
motion for a preliminary injunction to be heard for argument 
today. I'd be willing to stipulate to that, Your Honor. 
But then they have their motion for preliminary injunction. 
And I would further, instead of coming back again for a 
permanent injunction, I would also stipulate so that the 
matter of this part of the litigation be completed. The 
rest of it, Your Honor, it appears to me at least, that is 
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is a — we are here on a motion — in a supplemental 
proceeding or for a motion to enforce the award. This is a 
hearing for a preliminary injunction, I'm stipulating before 
the Court, so I don't see why waste the judicial resources. 
And, number two, instead of — not only I'm 
stipulating to the issue of the preliminary injunction, 
there's no — I will stipulate to the permanency of it as 
well, so we don't have another hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, the temporary restraining order, 
of course, is granted on the basis of probability of 
prevailing — final determination prevailing. So with 
respect to your — with respect to your assumption that the 
Court has already ruled on that, I've only ruled on the 
probability of prevailing not on the ultimate fact. 
I'm really disturbed by the representation of 
Counsel that there has not been compliance with the 
temporary restraining order. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Well, may I address that point, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. COLESSIDES: The award — the arbitrator's 
award came on — on Friday the 11th. I communicated that 
award, Your Honor, to the arbitrator — to the — to my 
clients. When they — over that same weekend. When they 
were locked out, they left and they went to — to Nevada to 
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think that there's been compliance with the order. 
Are you asking for a contempt citation against 
them on this basis, or what are you asking for? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I will. Yes, I do, Your Honor, 
because they have not complied. 
THE COURT: All right. You want to present 
evidence on that fact, I'll hear the evidence. And let's do 
that first. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
THE COURT: So go ahead and present your evidence. 
MR. WILLIAMS: We, first, Your Honor, would like 
to call Maria Whitaker — Mary Whitaker, sorry. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Whitaker, come up and be 
sworn. 
I can tell you now that we're going to take no 
more than 50 minutes to do this whole proceeding today, so 
let's move right along. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
MARY WHITAKER, 
called as a witness by the defendants, 
being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified on her oath as follows: 
THE COURT: I want to hear evidence on compliance 
with the order. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
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Q-
exists 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
units. 
Q. 
A. 
BY MR. 
Q. 
Is there any inventory that you are aware of that j 
but you do not have access to? 
The access that he removed. 
I' m sorry? 
The inventory that he removed from the storage 
Okay. Thank you. 
That's the six storage units. 
MR. COLESSIDES: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. One. One question. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
WILLIAMS: 
Is there inventory stored in storage units in 
St. George? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
And do you have access to those storage units? 
We do now. But that access was not made available 
to us and we were given access by the owners of those units 
after we discussed with them the situation. 
MR. WILLIAMS: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any cross — recross? 
MR. COLESSIDES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. 
I have one question. That is: Do you have any 
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1 evidence to show that the temporary restraining order was 
2 served on any of the defendants? 
3 MR. WILLIAMS: I don't, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to find at 
5 this point that there is no violation of the restraining 
6 order because it hasn't been served, and I'm going to 
7 continue this process and we're going to continue the 
8 temporary restraining order. 
9 I'm going to ask that the plaintiffs provide any 
10 proceeds from any sales that they've received on any 
11 business that they have been conducting anywhere following 
12 the date of the arbitration award. That would include any 
13 business here in Utah, any business in Nevada or any other 
14 state. 
15 I also want them to produce copies of their bank 
16 accounts and any — any accounts in their names. 
17 Counsel, I also want you to provide for the 
18 defendants an address where the plaintiffs may be served the 
19 temporary restraining order. And can you do that today? 
20 MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, I can't because I do 
21 not have one. 
22 THE COURT: Do you have any contact — way of 
23 contacting these people? Do they have any cell phones or 
24 any — 
25 MR. COLESSIDES: By cell phone only, Your Honor. 
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purposes? 
no violat 
I were to 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. COLESSIDES: May I ask for clarification 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. COLESSIDES: If the Court found that there is 
ion of the temporary restraining order, may I — if 
stipulate, wouldn't that obviate — 
THE COURT: I've only found that he has not shown 
that the — the temporary restraining order has been served, 
and so I expect that to be served and I want to hear what 
the other side has to say about it. And we'll hear on the 
13th what they have to say about it. Okay? 
MR. COLESSIDES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
THE CLERK: Court is in recess. 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 3:41 p.m., 
the hearing was concluded.) 
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3 THE COURT: Okay, counsel, do you want to state 
4 your appearances, please? 
5 MR. COLESSIDES: Nick J. Colessides appearing on 
6 behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor. 
7 MR. WILLIAMS: David Williams on behalf of the 
8 defendants. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. All right. This is a 
10 continuation of the prior session, and there were a number 
11 of questions that the Court had about the current status of 
12 things. 
13 Counsel, Mr. Williams, do you want to tell me 
14 what's going on currently? 
15 MR. WILLIAMS: I do, Your Honor. 
16 In terms of the factual status of the case, 
17 nothing has changed since the previous hearing. What I mean 
18 by that is that none of the assets which were ordered to be 
19 returned have been returned. We had attempted a personal 
20 service of the temporary restraining order and the amended 
21 temporary restraining order, we were unable to locate the 
22 plaintiffs, but it appears that they are here today. 
23 And so I think that, procedurally, the status is 
24 that we have several pending motions, we have our motion for 
25 a temporary restraining order, which our current motion is 
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to have it converted into an injunction. We have our motion 
to confirm the arbitrator's award. We have our motion for a 
judgment conforming to the arbitrator's award. We have a 
motion that was made orally at the last hearing but, 
essentially, an order — or a motion for a finding of 
contempt for their failure to obey the temporary restraining 
order. 
Also pending is the plaintiff's motion to vacate 
or modify the arbitrator's award. And so that I think that, 
today, those motions are — are pending and need to be 
resolved. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have a copy of the 
order? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I have a copy of the temporary 
restraining order. I did not bring a copy. I inadvertently 
left the amended restraining order at the office, but my 
secretary's bringing it and it'll be here in a few minutes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's begin with the 
motion to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Do you want to say anything about 
that? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I do, Your Honor. I would like to. 
Essentially, the elements are the same. What I 
mean the elements are the same, the elements for obtaining 
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1 MR. COLESSIDES: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: All right? 
3 MR. COLESSIDES: I understand that. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. And go ahead and tell me, then, 
5 what your arguments are on converting the TRO to preliminary 
6 or permanent injunction. 
7 MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, the basis for — as 
8 you look at the award, Your Honor, the award does not, under 
9 any circumstances, provide for the return of monies and for 
10 the return of a truck. As you look at the award, Your 
11 Honor — 
12 THE COURT: I'm not talking about the award. I'm 
13 talking about the Court's order that's in place, that's been 
14 in place for, I don't know, a month and a half, I guess. 
15 MR. COLESSIDES: And this is the — this is the 
16 dilemma that we have, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Well, your clients obey 
18 the Court's order, okay? That's what they do. I don't care 
19 what the arbitration — for the purpose of this Court's 
20 order, it doesn't matter what the arbitration award is. 
21 That's the order. And that's what they comply with, okay? 
22 Now, we can deal with these other issues, and if 
23 it's necessary to do that, fine. But the reason that order 
24 was put in place was to maintain the status quo. And that 
25 was — that was what the Court said. And that followed the 
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wrote a check out of the company account not only to pay the 
arbitrator fees but to pay their personal legal fees. We 
have an issue with that. But, nonetheless, we would be 
willing to stipulate that the money that is in the account 
be used to satisfy or to pay — to make good that check, and 
then we'll take up the fact that they still owe that money 
to the company at a later date. But we would — we would 
stipulate that that money go to the arbitrator. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, Court will order 
that the account be unfrozen and that the arbitrator's check 
be honored. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Any additional money would be assets 
of the company. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Is the Court going to take the 
issue of the award, the confirmation of the award, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: I don't think that today is the day to 
do that. I think we need to hear, perhaps, more evidence on 
that issue. I don't want to even go into that until we have 
the status re-established. So we can set another time to do 
that. 
MR. COLESSIDES: For purposes of this hearing, 
Your Honor, may I make a pro forma objection? That is — 
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THE COURT: All right. If there's any issue 
regarding cooperation in dealing with that, I assume you' 
bring it to the attention of the Court. 
MR. WILLIAMS: We will. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then we'll be in recess. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 11:58 a.m., 
the hearing was concluded.) 
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THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Good afternoon, sir. 
THE COURT: Apparently, we had a matter scheduled 
that didn't get on our calendar today. We apologize for the 
delay. Counsel, do you want to state your appearances? 
MR. COLESSIDES: Nick J. Colessides appearing on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor. 
MR. WILLIAMS: David Williams appearing on behalf 
of the defendant, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We have a couple of matters 
that are, apparently, pending. One's a proposed order 
confirming the arbitration award, and we have also, as I see 
the file, a motion by the plaintiffs to vacate the 
arbitrator's award. That was filed back in August. 
Okay. Are there other matters that are — to 
consider today? 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, yes. There's a 
couple of matter. 
Insofar as — and the minor item is something we 
agreed upon between Mr. Williams and myself. As it relates 
to the truck which was already returned to the credit union, 
we made the agreement that Mr. Duke may take — because 
there's no equity in the truck, Your Honor — may take the 
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1 MR. COLESSIDES: 2001. 
2 THE COURT: And the section dealing with vacating 
3 the award was last changed May 15th, 2003. So, it would 
4 seem to me that, if that's true, that — you know, the 
5 legislature obviously could have changed that. They could 
6 have stuck in some language that would have modified it or, 
7 you know, qualified it some way. They didn't do that. If 
8 there's a — if there's a technical problem regarding 
9 notifying the State — or the corporations department, I 
10 would assume that, when the — when the order is confirmed by 
11 the Court, which is the prerogative of either party to the 
12 arbitration award, I assume, then if it's necessary to 
13 notify the State at that point, they can be notified. 
14 And, in that sense, I suppose it is even qualified 
15 as a judicial determination. But I don't see — I don't see 
16 this as exceeding the arbitrator's award. And if that's the 
17 only issue that we're talking about, I would — I would find 
18 that, as a matter of law, that that does not exceed the 
19 arbitrator's authority. 
20 Do you have — is there another point where you 
21 think — 
22 MR. COLESSIDES: The only point I'm making, Your 
23 Honor, is I don't quite know if that specific version of 
24 the — the specific portion of the Act, Exceeding Authority, 
25 is not — does not — precedes 2001 and may go back to 1990. 
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1 for other reasons. For example, as I've indicated, I think 
2 that the fact that this order is subject to being confirmed 
3 judicially that it then becomes a judicial determination in 
4 the same sense as required under the statute. So, either 
5 way, I think that it's covered. And, certainly, you could 
6 challenge that in an appropriate forum at an appropriate 
7 time. 
8 MR. COLESSIDES: I understand that, Your Honor. 
9 May I ask a clarification, Your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: Sure. 
11 MR. COLESSIDES: AS I see the award — as I 
12 understand the ruling of the Court, it would be that it 
13 confirms the award as stated in No. 1, 2, 3... 
14 THE COURT: Well, I think the award is unusual in 
15 that the arbitrator goes on to say — 
16 MR. COLESSIDES: Right. 
17 THE COURT: — that he's adding some additional 
18 paragraphs — 
19 MR. COLESSIDES: Right. 
20 THE COURT: — not by way of findings or 
21 conclusions but by way of clarification and explanation. 
22 MR. COLESSIDES: And my — 
23 THE COURT: And I've seen a lot of arbitration 
24 awards over the years; I've never seen that kind o£ language 
25 included in an award. I haven't read that many by 
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Arbitrator Scott, but I think the award has to be looked at 
in the context of all of the pages from the beginning until 
the end, and whether it's by clarification or by explanation 
or whatever, and I think it has to be read in its entirety. 
And I don't intend, in confirming the award, which I would 
do unless there's some other point that's made that would 
convince me not to, I would not intend to confirm only a 
part of that award or the first 16 lines of that award but, 
rather, the entire award, from the beginning all the way to 
the end. And I — let me see how many pages we've got here. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Pages 1 through 8, Your Honor. 
That's the eighth, the signature page. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I think that it would be all — 
MR. COLESSIDES: Okay. 
THE COURT: — all eight pages. 
MR. COLESSIDES: All right. You would adopt 
them — the Court would adopt them, what the arbitrator — and 
that's for clarification purposes so I'll know which way the 
Court is ruling, Your Honor. Because I am at a loss, 
somehow, to explain the arbitrator's language on line 10 of 
page 3 that says the comments are not to be construed or 
taken to be findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
So I do not — with all due respect, Your Honor, 
when the Court confirms the award, do you confirm that part 
of the award as a — as a part of the order? 
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THE COURT: I do. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Okay. 
THE COURT: He says that they are provided to 
assist the parties and their counsel to understand the 
reasons that form the basis for the award. Howevei:, he 
calls them findings of fact or conclusions. I don't think 
he has to. I think he's saying, "These are the reasons why 
I've given my award." And I think they are of an cissist in 
trying to understand the whole context of the award. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Okay. I just wanted to make 
that — help me understand that part, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COLESSIDES: You're not limiting the award to 
the award only, but you're including, by reference, 
everything else. Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. That's all. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, and I guess I apologize 
if you hadn't ruled, but I — if you have ruled, I would like 
to submit a — 
THE COURT: Well, I understand from Mr. Colessides 
that he has nothing further to add. So based on that, my — 
my ruling would be, as I indicated, that I would confirm the 
award from page 1 through page 8, the entire document, as 
the award in this matter. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I have submitted, and I 
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1 judgment as well as attaching it as an exhibit, just so that 
2 I would be sure to comply with that rule. 
3 THE COURT: So you're \not adopting by reference, 
4 you're just repeating verbatim everything in the award. 
5 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. 
6 THE COURT: So your representation to me and to 
7 Mr. Colessides is that, other than misspelling "judgment," 
8 you have copied everything verbatim, including nothing more, 
9 and leaving out nothing, than is set forth in the award, 
10 other than the beginning statements and the concluding 
11 signatures. 
12 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor. There may be — 
13 oh, there is one — there is one change. On page 4 — 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. WILLIAMS: — right under where it says 
16 "Arbitrator's Written Comments." 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
18 MR. WILLIAMS: "At the request of the parties, the 
19 arbitrator is..." 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MR. WILLIAMS: I inserted that language because he 
22 u s e d — I think he named himself or "I am." He said, "At the 
23 request of the parties, I am providing..." 
24 THE COURT: Okay. So — 
25 MR. WILLIAMS: And just by bracket, I said the 
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1 arbitrator is rather than saying "I am." 
2 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, it would 
3 appear to me that this is in order. I don't know that it 
4 does anything different from signing the confirmation order 
5 that I've signed. So I'm going to go ahead, unless 
6 Mr. Colessides wants to state some other substantive 
7 objection. 
8 MR. COLESSIDES: I have not had an opportunity, 
9 Your Honor, to review it. I just looked at it as it was 
10 given to me. 
11 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sign it. 
12 I'll give you — if you need 3 0 days to — if you want to 
13 raise an objection, I'll be happy to let you do it. 
14 MR. COLESSIDES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Again, I want to 
16 compliment counsel on both sides. I think you've both done 
17 a superb job in trying to educate the Court and brief this 
18 matter. I think your representation of your clients has 
19 been vigorous and has been thorough. I compliment both of 
20 you on that. I wish everybody who came in did such a 
21 thorough job. 
22 Obviously, in these cases, one side prevails and 
23 one side doesn't prevail. In this case, it would appear to 
24 the Court that the defendants have prevailed and they would 
25 be entitled to your relief under that — under that 
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1 conclusion, 
2 I would just reiterate what I said. I think I've 
3 arbitrated personally over the years, as an advocate, maybe 
4 I 150 arbitration cases. I have served as an arbitrator also 
on a number of cases. And I feel that it is a — it is a 
6 I good system, but one of the reasons it's good is because the 
7 award of the arbitrator has such a potential finality. And 
8 in this instance, it's obvious that the plaintiffs don't 
9 J agree with what the arbitrator did and, you know, that's 
their prerogative. But that doesn't mean that it shouldn't 
be enforced under the law. 
So, again, thank you. I compliment you on what 
you've done. And, unless there's something further, we'll 
14 I be in recess, 
15 J MR. COLESSIDES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor, 
17 I (Whereupon, at the hour of 3:06 p.m., 
18 the hearing was concluded.) 
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